

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

SE/FI/CE

Horn 1003

NO.

11 7831

DATE

17 Nov 53

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. SE/CPP	()			X	
2.	()			cec	
3.	()			SSK	
4. SE/CFI	0	19 Nov. 14		✓	
5.					
6. DO/SE				AW	
7.					
8. C/SE			18 Oct or Nov?	JH	8-10 Excellent report JH
9.					
10. SE/FI/CE				X	11-15 See attached Commu Comments HBF
11. OC-S	DEC 1	JAN 13 1954 JAN 18 1954		JH	W 11 Rec
12.					1 c.c. SE/CPM 1 c.c. C/SE-1 1 c.c. SE/FI/CE 1 c.c. Field
13. SE/1					File Apple
14.					
15. SE/1	1003 5800				

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

13 November 1953

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

Subject: APPIE CE Review

Reference: Security Review of APPIE Team Operations, SGAW 2835, 21 October 1953

1. Attached is a discussion of those aspects of the operation which affect its security or which are necessary for its understanding. No attempt has been made to duplicate the reference; this review pays more attention to the w/t traffic and includes the recent developments in the operation.

2. No definite conclusions appear reachable at present as to when the operation came under control other than that it probably did come under such control, possibly as early as July or August 1952, with a reluctant hostile A/A reception to a resupply C-47 on the night of 23 October 1953.

3. Critical points during the operation possibly indicative of control or penetration are discussed in detail in the attachment and are summarized as follows:

a. There is an improbable possibility that the operation was penetrated from the outset by RNDomino, the w/t operator.

b. Powerful flashlights of a type not given APPIE were seen by the plane crew at the D/Z in a drop on 8 May 1952.

c. A resupply drop was made on the night of 6/7 July 1952 to a T-lighted D/Z with the reception lights not prepared by APPIE.

d. APPIE ignored a 12 August 1952 case officer control challenge in five subsequent exchanges; it replied to 24 and 27 August 1952 rechallenges with a positive control answer on 28 August 1952, and when immediately rechallenged, gave another positive control response on 3 September 1952.

e. APPIE ignored requests by the base on 5 and 18 September 1952 and 6 October 1952 for first one and then two "friends" to exfiltrate.

f. APPIE radioed on 3 November 1952 that RNDomino, the w/t operator, had broken his operating hand and was using his left hand; Athens reported a definite new fist operating with the sharpness of the dots being indicative of a trained professional.

g. APPIE failed to respond to a case officer control challenge first raised on 3 November 1952, and reraised on 24 and 27 November, until 29 November when it gave a positive control response.

h. The 13 December 1952 response to the Zog-formulated control challenges was inconclusive rather than definitely favorable.

i. The 29 January 1953 flight during which Throwoff/2, a relief w/t operator, was dropped may have been insecure because of the absence of diversionary tactics; APPIE reported being involved in a firefight on 4 February 1953.

j. APPIE reported on 16 April 1953 that a friend "who pretends to be a Communist" would exfiltrate with APPIE/3.

k. According to a report from a sister of Airtight in Yugoslavia, four men, including Airtight and RNCertain, were betrayed and captured by Albanian authorities about May 1953; however, there are a number of contradictory independent reports on the fate of team members.

l. APPIE/2 radioed contradictory reports on 5 and 10 June 1953 concerning the 4 June 1953 dropping of four men of the ORANGE and PLUM teams; the APPIE/2 performance subsequently fell off.

m. APPIE/3 ^{reported being} ~~was~~ involved in a fire fight on 5 June 1953 and was last heard from on 18 June 1953.

n. APPIE/2 on 22 October 1953 reported that it had been awaiting a drop since 19 October, and then later that day, when told to expect a drop that night, indicated that it was not yet at the same D/Z and so could not receive the drop that night; the delay could have been used to prepare the A/A reception on 23 October.

4. Significant points during the operation possibly indicative of absence of control or penetration are also discussed in detail in the attachment and are summarized as follows:

a. Radio communication control signals were negative throughout the entire operation.

b. Negative case officer control challenge responses were given by RNDomino during June 1952 and three team members exfiltrated safely that same month.

c. The relief w/t operator, Throwoff/2, came on the air two days after his 29 January 1953 drop with a message containing a prearranged negative control sentence; if he had fallen into the opposition's hands at the time of his drop they only had two days in which to break him. (Since APPIE had informed the base before the drop that there would be some friends at the D/Z and had set up a password-counter-password exchange, the opposition, if in control, might have been able to debrief him without immediate suspicion on his part; force or the threat of force also might have been used successfully.)

d. Throwoff/2 gave a negative control response for APPIE/2 on 20 June 1953 in response to a 19 June case officer control challenge.

5. Some other aspects of the operation affecting security, which are discussed in detail in the attachment, are summarized as follows:

a. Several of the drops required waiting periods at the D/Z of several days and the team several times complained about the security hazards involved therein.

b. As a result of the RNDomino hand switch-over Athens was instructed to tape both of an operator's hands in the future.

c. There is insufficient information in the files to adequately assess the recruitment, training, safehousing and transportation of the agents, and our liaison with the Greek services in connection with ~~the~~ APPLE's initial infiltration.

d. [] did not submit the necessary PRQ outlines and field traces results on Gablution, an ORANGE team member, and as a result no operational clearance was instituted.

e. No information was reported from the field on two letters brought in by Throwoff/2 and RNPutlog and mailed within Albania.

f. Because [] considered the case officer control challenge given RNDomino susceptible to misinterpretation, it took special precautions in devising challenges for Throwoff/2.

g. It might have been particularly desirable for the base to have raised case officer control challenges shortly before dropping RNCertain on 4 August 1952, soon after making the 6 September 1952 resupply drop, and before making the September and October 1953 resupply drops; challenging on the last two occasions, however, was debatable.

h. There is no information indicating that traces were made on eleven internal contacts reported by APPLE on 12 March 1953.

i. With respect to the dropping of ORANGE and PLUM to APPLE/2, the question might be raised as to whether the disadvantages of blind dropping were not outweighed by the disadvantages involved in the breakdown of inter-team compartmentation, particularly in view of questionable incidents in APPLE's previous operational history.

j. One or more of APPLE/2's identities may have been known by ORANGE and/or PLUM before the latter were parachuted on 4 June 1953.

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13 November 1953

APPIE CE REVIEW

1 May 1952

A five-man APPIE team infiltrated across the Greek-Albanian border into Albania with the aid of two cross-border guides. The team consisted of Airtight, RNPutlog, RNDomino, Airwise and Airometer; the cross-border guides were Airmail and Air-spray. There is insufficient information in the files to adequately assess the recruitment, training, safehousing and transportation of the agents and our liaison with the Greek services in connection with the operation. (This is discussed in detail in the Headquarters Security Review of APPIE.)

Adverse information is reflected in the files only on RNDomino, the w/t operator who on 3 November 1952 radioed that his operating hand had been broken and that he had to use his other hand. RNDomino and another Albanian, Hysen Sallku, had both been reported in 1951 by Italian sources as being Albanian I.S. agents. The field investigated the charges and on 21 May 1951 reported the two as being cleared of all suspicion and that the details would be "pouched soonest". The latter report is not in Headquarters files and apparently never was received. (On 21 October 1953, as a result of the Headquarters Security Review of APPIE, the field was requested to furnish a copy for Headquarters study.) Sallku was parachuted into Albania on 15 October 1951 with three other men; his death as a result of an ambush by state security forces was reported by Radio Tirana on 24 October 1951.

Comment: Although RNDomino thus may have been an Albanian I.S. agent from the start of the operation, the fact that three APPIE members exfiltrated a few weeks later, plus the fact that negative control responses were made six times during June to a case officer control challenge, supports the probability that the team was not controlled from the start unless RNDomino delayed contacting Albanian security forces after his drop. There is of course the theoretical possibility that the three exfiltrate had been turned by the Albanian I.S. but there is no evidence to substantiate this. Also the failure to later respond favorably to case officer control challenges is inexplicable if the operation was controlled from the outset. In addition, if RNDomino were a penetration from the start, there would have been no need for the change in fists which occurred when he allegedly broke his operating fist, unless, while a penetration, he actually accidentally did break his hand or for some reason become uncontrollable.

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8 May 1952 Powerful flashlights of a type not given APPIE were seen by the plane crew on the reception field during a pre-arranged supply drop.
Comment: The flashlights could have been evidence of control or could have been obtained from local team contacts.

27 May 1952 The first w/t contact since 8 May informed the base all was well.

28 May 1952 Airtight, the leader, ordered three team members (RNPutlog, Airwise and Airometer) to return to Greece because of poor food conditions in the operating area. The three men separated from Airtight and RNDomino on 28 May and exfiltrated to Greece on 15 June. RNPutlog and Airometer were parachuted back on 1 May and 4 June 1953 respectively. Airwise was used later in other Albanian operations and is now in Athens.

12 June 1952 APPIE radioed that they were being "pursued" and that their operational area had been alerted security-wise against agents.

27 June 1952 On 27 May the base had radioed the case officer control challenge, "How Many Rifles Have You?" APPIE returned a negative control response, "We want blankets" in its 3 June contact; although not again rechallenged, it repeated this safety phrase during contacts on 12 June, 15 June (sent in English contrary to instructions), 18 June (again sent in English), 24 June and 27 June.

7 July 1952 A resupply drop, including radio, arms, food and ammunition, was made on the night of 6/7 July. APPIE radioed that the plane had circled the area for one hour, that the drop was made without the pilots seeing their signals, that the material had been found by the police and that they were forced to hide in wooded areas. [] reported that:
 "The bundles were released over a group of lights or shepherd's fires coincidentally resembling a "T" or alert security forces arranged their own reception to divert delivery of our supplies. There would have been time for such a measure as the plane was on its third circle of the area when the lights were first observed... In any case we now know that APPIE did not receive any of the supplies prepared for it because the plane flew the wrong place"
 due to an error in navigation. The resupply flight path had different Albanian entry and exit points; the plane ran into light enemy A/A action after making leaflet drops at Korce about 25 minutes after the resupply drop.
Comment: In light of the preceding, the possibility exists that the team came under control some time between this drop and the 13 August failure to respond properly to the case officer control challenge.

15 July 1952

APPIE reported rumors among the population that other persons had been dropped.

Comment: Possible information elicitation by the opposition.

4 August 1952

RNCertain, an agent with important implantation contacts, was parachuted in to join APPIE. In a 3 August message setting up the drop APPIE radioed that "friends of ours will be at the D/Z to hide the supplies. If he is not found immediately, (RNCertain) is to give the password Berat; the counter password is Burrel". *Adm I*

Comment: By preparing RNCertain to expect non-team members at the D/Z the opposition, if already in control, could ensure capturing him without immediately arousing his suspicions in case both APPIE members were not fully controllable. This could facilitate an immediate debriefing of him for instructional information, etc. It might have been desirable for the base to have raised the case officer control challenge again before dropping RNCertain. *Adm G*

9 August 1952

APPIE radioed that security forces were searching the recent D/Z area.

Comment: This could be an indication of no control or of disarming realism by an opposition case officer. If the team were not then controlled, the presence of security forces might possibly have resulted in the team's capture between then and 13 August when APPIE failed to respond to a case officer control challenge.

12 August -
13 September
1952

The base raised the case officer control challenge, "How Many Rifles Have You?", in a contact on 12 August. APPIE ignored the challenge in exchanges on 13, 15, 16, 18 and 24 August. The base therefore rechallenge APPIE on 24 and 27 August. On 28 August APPIE replied with a straight answer giving the number of arms on hand, an indication of control. The base again rechallenge on 28 August and on 3 September received a similar positive control reply. Radio communication control signals, however, continued to be negative.

[] commented that "it is improbable that the team has forgotten its instructions on this signal, but due to the impending resupply drop it may have been interpreted as a straight question."

Comment: APPIE did not confuse the case officer control challenge during June when a similar resupply drop was impending. Furthermore the constant reiteration of the question might well have served to call attention to the fact that it was a control question. Also why the long delay in responding if the team was uncontrolled but misconstrued the questions? Although the continuance of negative radio communication signals may be construed however, as evidence of lack of control, it is possible also that RNDomino had yielded these signals to his captors without giving them the correct case officer control challenge exchange. Such exchanges are included in communications plans with just such an eventuality in mind. *The secret use of the same*

challenge by the base, also had been explained by the
it would appear that the ~~SECRET~~ *Security Information*

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6 September 1952

On the night of 5/6 September a resupply mission was flown but no drop was made because no reception lights were visible. APPIE radioed on the morning of 6 September that "plane crossed last night. He crossed far away as we are told. For this reason we did not light the fires". Athens estimated that the plane probably flew over the wrong area although the crew reported making the drop the next night at the same area they had searched the previous night.

Comment: There is a possibility that an uncontrolled APPIE would not have found out so quickly that a plane had crossed "far away".

15 September 1952

APPIE radioed that the w/t set had been received but that another container which had fallen too far away, because of being dropped from a great height, had been found by civilians and turned over to the security forces.

Comment: If the team was under control the opposition might not want to call attention to the danger of capture. On the other hand this could be reported for realism and to entice more resupply. The base, therefore, might have reraised the case officer control challenge at this point after the drop, if for no other reason than to test the validity of its hypothesis that the team had misconstrued the challenge because of the impending 6 September supply drop.

September -
October 1952

Probably as a means in part of testing the bona fides of APPIE the base, in messages on 5 and 18 September and 6 October asked for first one and then two "friends" to exfiltrate. APPIE ignored these requests in its messages.

Comment: The ignoring of these requests may possibly be suspicious.

3 October 1952

APPIE requested that "for many reasons" there be no drops in October.

Comment: This message can be interpreted either as absence of control or, if controlled, as misleading realism or a stalling device by the opposition case officer.

10 October 1952

APPIE reported King Zog's influence as great in Tirana, Kruja, and Burrel and requested the dispatch of new agents.

Comment: Possible intoxication effort if controlled.

27 October 1952

APPIE reported an indirect contact with a sergeant major of the police in Peshkopi.

Comment: If the team was controlled, this could represent an effort to build up the team's potential; if the team was uncontrolled, it could represent a future security hazard.

3 November 1952

APPIE radioed that RNDomino had broken his operating hand and was using his left hand. [] reported that an investigator had revealed negative radio communication control signals, a definite new fist operating, speed far below normal and sharp dots indicating a trained fist operating. The communications training officer believed the operator was capable of using

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his other hand but that it was debatable. The base immediately (3 November) raised the case officer control challenge, "How many rifles have you?" APPLE did not respond to the challenge in contacts on 6, 12, 15, and 18 November. Radio communication control signals continued negative however. In response to a Headquarters' query as to whether the Q signals were noticeably slow after 3 November and thus suggestive of the operator discussing the exchange with his controllers, [] replied that the Q signals appeared to be normal considering the use of a left hand. Comment: APPLE's failure again to respond to the case officer control challenge may indicate either a continuation or a recent initiation of control. If the team had not previously been under control, the 3 October message requesting that no drop be made in October might have been due to pressure of security forces, which pressure might have subsequently resulted in the team's capture. If the team had been controlled for some time, the question arises of why the opposition would have endangered the progress of the playback by introducing a new fist. Possible reasons for such action may have been an actual accident to RNDOMINO, increasing distrust of RNDOMINO, or a gamble that the crisis could be surmounted successfully and another W/T operator who might prove more co-operative enticed.

- 15 November 1952 APPLE requested help on 15 November and on 24 November asked either to return or for another W/T operator.
Comment: Although the request for another operator could represent an intoxication effort, the raising of exfiltration as the other alternative could be either evidence of lack of control or the opposition's taking of a calculated risk. If the latter it was well calculated, because [] on 2 December considered it a practical impossibility for the team, or any member thereof, to exfiltrate at that time because of deep snows, mountainous terrain and general winter weather conditions.
- 18 November 1952 The base, in response to Headquarters' instructions, asked for specific positive intelligence, one purpose being to help assess the possibility of control.
Comment: APPLE's subsequent replies evidently were considered satisfactory because the files do not reflect the raising of the possibility of deception with reference to them. They might, as at the other times during the operation, have been "fed", however.
- 24-29 November 1952 Case officer control challenges, "How many rifles have you?" were raised again by the base on 24 and 27 November. On 29 November APPLE

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responded, giving the number of arms on hand, which was a positive control response. [] nevertheless, discounted on 2 December the probability of control, ~~raising~~ again as a reasonable possibility that the case officer control challenge had been misunderstood as an inquiry for purposes of resupply. [] also stated that in addition to this argument and to the continuance of an uncontrolled reply to both radio communication danger signals, the "case officers who trained and dispatched the team ~~and~~ consider it of highest caliber and feel confident (the) team would have found some clear way of showing control if it existed".

Comment: See comments under dates of 3 November and 12 August-3 September above.

3 December 1952 APPLE's radio message omitted the confirmation number groups supposed to be added at the end of all messages to indicate positive or negative control. [] hypothesized that since the other radio communication danger signals were regular and since this was the first time confirmation groups were omitted, RNDOMINO had forgotten to include them when he was recopying the message.

12-13 December 1952 Ex-King Zog had been asked on 26 November for possible control questions which might be put to the radio operator to determine whether he was actually in touch with the team leader and sending for him. On 8 December, Zog replied with two questions to be passed to the team:

- (1) "Are you in good condition?"
- (2) "Do you remember in whose hands you left your silver cuff links before your departure?"

The expected answers were respectively:

- (1) "The people believe in us and help us put themselves at the King's disposal."
- (2) "To the queen or mistress of the house."

Zog reported that the first question had been discussed with him prior to the departure of the team, and that the second was known only to Airtight and himself.

Both questions were raised by the base on 12 December and APPLE on 13 December replied to the second (though not to the first), as follows:

"The silver cuff links are in (Airtight's) suitcase; (RNDOMINO), in the small box there. Don't bother us unnecessarily."

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A search of Airtight's suitcase, left with OBOPUS in Athens, revealed the cuff links to be there "as stated". When Zog was informed of the radio reply, he stated in a conversation with [] SE/CPP, in Alexandria, that he felt that the team's answer while not as expected, was accurate and genuine since they had no prearranged control signals and the leader probably had more than one set of links. As a result the team was considered to be uncontrolled.

Comments: It is significant that the first question was unanswered and that the reply to the second gave the locations of both Airtight's and RNCERTAIN's cuff links, indicating that if the team were under control, the case officer (and the W/T operator) did not know to whom the query was addressed and therefore tried to cover both in the reply. On the other hand if the team were controlled, the members might have given their captors a completely erroneous answer in the hopes of getting across a positive control signal. However, if the team were controlled, theoretically they might have yielded the information under severe pressure; generally speaking, the results of the exchange appear to be only inconclusive.

27 December 1952 The base informed APPLE that another W/T operator, plus supplies, would be dropped during the period 3-7 January. APPLE on 12 December had radioed that RNDOMINO was very weak with an infected hand. [] had reported that APPLE's transmissions were very slow.
Comment: If controlled, possible intoxication effort.

3-15 January 1953 W/T operator drop flights were aborted on 3 and 7 January 1953 due to weather. APPLE complained at the security hazards involved in complying with instructions to stand by for a drop during the periods 3-9 and 12-15 January.
Comment: The stand-by instructions do seem to involve a security hazard, but the poor weather at this time of the year may have made more precise pre-timing impossible. APPLE's complaint is either evidence of absence of control or if controlled, realistic dissemblage by the opposition.

29-31 January 1953 THROWOFF/2, a replacement W/T operator was dropped on 29 January. He had new radio communication danger signals and new case officer control challenge questions. He was sent in with a letter instructing AIRTIGHT ~~should~~ exfiltrate in the spring if possible and that RNPOTLOG would be sent back to help him get out. He was briefed carefully to answer case officer control challenges. THROWOFF/2 was dropped during a second flight attempt since an unsuccessful flight to a nearby wrong D/Z area was made the night preceding the successful drop. On 29 January flight the plane went in and out at the same point and dropped

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no diversionary leaflets. Prior to the drop, on 31 December, APPLE had informed the base that there would be some friends at the D/Z and that the password and counter password would be "Kruja" and "Korabi" respectively.

APPLE's first message after the drop was sent on 31 January. All radio communication control signals were negative and the message contained a prearranged negative control sentence.

Comment: The negative control indicators in the 31 January message may have been a true reflection of the situation or THROWOFF/2 may have been taken into custody at the drop and debriefed of the requisite information, either without immediate suspicion by the "friends" prearranged to meet him at the drop, or by force or threat of force. The path of the 29 January flight may have been a security hazard in drawing attention to the D/Z area after the drop, if the team was not already controlled, because of its same entry and exit point, its relatively direct flight to the D/Z and the absence of diversionary leaflet drops. (See the attached map for the actual flight route, ~~as compared to the planned routes.~~)

4 February 1953 APPLE reported being in a fire fight in which one Communist civilian was killed.

Comment: If APPLE was previously uncontrolled it might have been captured and come under control soon after this incident because of the resultant alerting of security forces in the area. If APPLE was controlled, it might be realistic dissemblage by an opposition case officer.

13 February 1953 APPLE radioed AIRTIGHT's agreement to coming out.

Comment: Either indicative of an absence of control or an intoxication effort aimed at the promised assistance of an exfiltration guide, RNPULOG.

28 February 1953 APPLE reported "pursuit detachments" had been in the operational zone during the preceding three days but had left.

Comment: See comments under date of 4 February 1953 above.

8 March 1953 APPLE responded affirmatively on 11 March to the base inquiry of 10 March as to whether a letter carried in by THROWOFF/2 had been mailed.

Comment: There is no information in the files indicating what the letter was. Possibly it may have been a poison pen letter. Without additional information the full security ramifications cannot be assessed although theoretically there may have been a security hazard involved in the internal posting.

12 March 1953 APPLE reported the names of 11 internal contacts.

Comment: There is no information in the files indicating that traces

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were made or the results of such traces. The possible security implications are obvious, particularly in view of a recent report that four men, including AIRTIGHT and RNCERTAIN, were betrayed to the Albanian authorities and captured about May 1953.

- 20 March 1953 [] Reported that in the 20 March contact APPLE had replied to the challenge sent by the base in the previous contact on 14 March and had indicated negative control.
Comment: The exchange must have involved a radio communication control challenge since the texts of the messages do not include either of the case officer control challenges and responses given THROWOFF/2 prior to departure. The exchange, however, either is evidence of lack of control, or of the opposition's success in obtaining the necessary signal information from THROWOFF/2.
- 16 April 1953 APPLE reported, regarding the planned drop of exfiltration guides, that RNDOMINO was ready to return with AIRTIGHT along with "one friend who pretends to be a Communist."
Comment: In view of the possible security hazard involved in the pretended Communist "friend", if the team were uncontrolled, the base might have asked for his name.
- 1 May 1953 Three exfiltration guides (RNPUTLOG, GABNEGATE, and GABOARD) were dropped to APPLE on 1 May; a drop attempted on 30 April had been aborted due to overcast. The base previously had alerted APPLE on 26 April to await a drop some time between 27 April and 4 May. APPLE complained that an eight-day waiting period at a D/Z was a security hazard. On 6 April APPLE reported that GABNEGATE had been injured in the drop. [] regarded his injury as normal since it was his first jump and he was the least capable man.
Comment: The instructions for an eight-day waiting period may have involved a security hazard. The circumstances of the drop are neither indicative of control or lack of control.
- 6-8 May 1953 APPLE reported on 6 May the existence of patrol activity in the D/Z area and on 8 May radioed that although it would like a drop, "one now would present danger".
Comment: [] commented on 18 August that if APPLE were controlled, the opposition could have been playing for a late request to get a plane, men or material; if APPLE were uncontrolled, the message could represent normal fear.
- 12 May 1953 Exfiltration group (APPLE/3) separated from stay-behind group (APPLE/2). APPLE/3 consisted of RNPUTLOG, GABNEGATE, GABOARD, AIRTIGHT, RNDOMINO,

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and an unidentified friend. APPLE/2 consisted of RNCERTAIN and THROWOFF/2.

Comment: If APPLE was already controlled at this time, the opposition may have played back as it did because an exfiltration had been ordered and not to follow through at this stage might have prevented further possible exploitation of the operation. Of possible relevance with respect to the question of control at this time are the following two reports on the fate of the team. According to one report an Albanian who visited in Yugoslavia in September 1953 a relative who is married to a sister of AIRTIGHT, was told that four men, including AIRTIGHT and RNCERTAIN, were betrayed and captured by Albanian authorities about five months previously, which would be about May 1953. If both men were captured together, the team would have come under control prior to the separation of APPLE/2 and APPLE/3. In an Italian radio broadcast on 25 August 1953, the Yugo-Press agency was cited as reporting the execution in Lushnja in central Albania of 20 Albanian peasants who had taken to the mountains in 1952 to protest against the regime. Said Kryeziu has stated that this was RNPOTLOG's home and that he believed that RNPOTLOG and his supporters were involved. The date and place of their capture is not given. If RNPOTLOG actually was captured in central Albania, the team could have come under control prior to the separation of APPLE/2 and APPLE/3, or APPLE/3 could have come under control shortly thereafter. Theoretically, also, control of APPLE/3 could have come as late as August if APPLE/3 had returned to central Albania from the Greek-Albanian border area where it was last heard from on 18 June.

Note: APPLE/3 will be discussed fully next, and then APPLE/2.

APPLE/3

15 May 1953

APPLE/3 informed the base they would have to change their exfiltration route.

Comment: [] commented on 18 August that, although the changed route was regarded as sensible, that if the team were controlled it would make it easier for the opposition to make realistic position reports to counter D/Ting from Greece.

19 May 1953

APPLE/3 reported AIRTIGHT had dysentery.

Comment: [] commented on 18 August that since this was a long-standing condition, the message represented true reporting if controlled.

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- 27 May 1953 APPLE/3 responded to the base's query as to whether it desired a food drop by stating that although it needed food and medicines they could not await a drop.
Comment: This could be evidence of lack of control since the opposition could have used a drop to get either supplies and/or the plane. On the other hand, since the base had notified APPLE/2 on 14 May that it was considering a personnel drop, the opposition, if in control, could have been holding out for this bigger drop.
- 5 June 1953 APPLE/3 reported running into an ambush near Vithkus in which RNPOTLOG was wounded. The fact of such an ambush could not be confirmed by []
- 10 June 1953 APPLE/3 reported it was unable to move because of RNPOTLOG's condition and requested:

"Send us a guide to cross the border and withdraw RNPOTLOG from us or else chances are will have to put him in a base here."
- Because of questionable reporting from APPLE/2 following the 4 June drop to APPLE/2 of PIUM and ORGANGE teams, the base decided to handle APPLE/3 as though it were controlled. On the assumption that APPLE/3's 10 June request for a guide might be an intoxication attempt, the base radioed a suggested exfiltration route and on 13 June requested AIRTIGHT and one man to exfiltrate separately for medicine, help and further instructions.
- 15 June 1953 APPLE/3 rejected the bases' last request and said all would continue together.
- 18 June 1953 APPLE/3 made its last contact, reporting its position to be approximately 12 miles from the border. [] reported that members of a Greek team exfiltrated on the night of 18 June without incident and passed through the area where the team was reported as being located. On the other hand another team which exfiltrated from Albania on 26 July learned of a gun battle against a four-man team at an unidentified location about 20 June, in which battle three men were killed and the fourth committed suicide. [] also reported on 18 August that a Greek border officer had reported hearing of the killing of a four-man group in southern Albania at an unknown date and named one of the APPLE/3 men (identity not given) as being in the group.
Comment: The above evidence is inconclusive with respect to the question of whether the team's ending was notional (because of previous control) or

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actual, although, of course theoretically the team could still possibly be in hiding. Other reports, discussed above in comments under date of 12 May 1953, have raised the possibilities that RNPOTLOG may have been captured in central Albania either before or shortly after APPLE/2 and APPLE/3 separated, or as late as August, and that AIRTIGHT and RNCERTAIN may have been captured together about May.

May-June 1953 ☐ reported that APPLE/3's first (whether right or left hand not indicated) was RNDOMINOS' as far as could be determined, that all radio communication control signals were proper, and that the team followed RNPOTLOG's specific instructions to report every change in location.
Comment: If the team were under control the transmission of the correct control signals could be the result of the opposition's previous success in obtaining them.

APPLE/2

14 May 1953 The base asked APPLE/2 whether it could receive a personnel drop between 27 May and 4 June (later modified to the period between 29 May and 4 June).

23 May 1953 APPLE/2 reported that the letter RNPOTLOG brought with him had been posted.
Comment: As in the case of the 11 March message reporting the mailing of a letter carried in by THROWOFF/2, there is no information in the files indicating what this letter was.

4 June 1953 The three-man ORANGE team (AIROMETER, GADUMMY, and GABLUTION) and the leader of the PLUM team, AICHIP, were dropped on 4 June to be briefed by APPLE/2 prior to moving on to their respective areas of operations. The other two men on the PLUM team, RNDEPART and AIRBLOWN were not dropped because one of them froze and blocked the other; the two men are at present in Athens or the Athens area being maintained ~~for~~ for potential use in future operations. The Headquarters case officer is of the opinion that one or more of the men who were dropped beforehand ~~knew~~ knew the identity of one or more of the men in the APPLE/2 reception group.
All men dropped had operational clearances except GABLUTION concerning whom Headquarters, on 21 October 1953, as a result of the Headquarters

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security review, requested PRQ outlines and results of ^{field} investigations so that ^{an} operational clearance could be instituted.

The drop was made, at APPLE/2's suggestion (made on 18 May), at the same D/Z used to drop the RNPULOG group on 1 May 1953. Before the drop finally was made APPLE/2 complained on 1 June about the security hazards involved in a six-day waiting period at the D/Z.

Comment: The fact that one or more of APPLE/2's identities may have been known beforehand by ORANGE and/or PLUM is a security hazard. The fact also that adequate data on GABIUTION is not available makes him theoretically a possible security hazard. The fact also that APPLE/2 chose the D/Z would help the opposition if it already were in control. The long period of waiting at the D/Z appears to have been a security hazard if the team were uncontrolled. Although there are disadvantages to blind dropping it is questionable as to whether they are not outweighed by the disadvantages involved in the resulting breakdown in inter-team compartmentation, by having one team act as a reception group for other teams with independent missions, *particularly if the reception group has a questionable previous operational history.*

5-10 June 1953

APPLE/2 on 5 June reported an incomplete drop, ^{on 4 June,} possibly referring to the failure of two of the three PLUM team members to drop, and *reported also* that the drop had been made from a high altitude. APPLE/2 asked therefore whether there would be a drop on 5 June but was told there would not be and that the PLUM leader should remain with APPLE/2 until he received further instructions. On 10 June, in suspicious contradiction to its message of 5 June, APPLE/2 stated that it understood "from your message", referring to a base query as to what had happened, that some personnel had been dropped on 4 June. APPLE/2 stated that the drop had been made away from the field and that APPLE/2 had had no contact with the persons dropped. After dawn, APPLE/2 had had to leave since Communist forces had appeared at the D/Z and later had heard rifle fire in the D/Z area. APPLE/2 stated that it did not know what had happened. Nothing further has ever been heard from ORANGE or PLUM.

Comment: It is possible that ORANGE and PLUM did not fall directly into the D/Z area and were picked up by security forces, if APPLE/2 were uncontrolled. Another possibility is that APPLE/2 came under control between 5 and 10 June. If the team were under control from the start, the opposition may have first sought to entice the remainder of PLUM, and failing to do so immediately, to provide a possible notional disposal of ORANGE and PLUM. Such disposal may have been deemed desirable because of an inability to break the new men and obtain the ORANGE W/T signal plan or because of lack of assets with

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which to exploit several major play-back operations, particularly since APPLE/2 might be able to be further exploited.

10 June 1953 The base informed APPLE/2 that it would drop arms during the period 17-20 June and asked that the PLUM leader be informed that his radio operators would be sent later.

12 June 1953 [] reported that as a result of the contradictory exchanges of 5 and 10 June it was handling APPLE/2 as well as APPLE/3 as probably controlled.

13-16 June 1953 APPLE/2 radioed on 13 June that it was unable to await a drop from 17 to 20 June, but on 16 June stated it still needed a drop to give its friends promised aid.

Comment: Possible intoxication attempt.

19-20 June 1953 On 19 June the base, for the first time, raised one of two case officer control challenges given THROWOFF/2, "Do you need leks?" APPLE/2 replied the next day, "We want maps," indicating negative control. (The actual pre-arranged negative control response was "Send us maps.") As a result of this favorable reply, the base told APPLE/2 supplies would be dropped. *Idem*

Comment: Although the favorable response to the challenge was indicative of absence of control, the opposition previously might have broken THROWOFF/2 completely and have been in control. Thus Athens on 26 June reported that it continued to recognize the possibility of control of the team but felt warranted in taking a calculated risk to maintain the operation particularly in view of APPLE/2's 25 June report of an indirect contact with the PLUM leader discussed below. Headquarters concurred in the field's plans.

22 June 1953 APPLE/2 confirmed the D/Z set up by the base on 20 June and requested a drop date. On 27 June APPLE/2 was told to await a drop from 27 to 30 June but no drop was made.

25 June 1953 APPLE/2 reported learning indirectly that Pal (Pali) Lushi had sent one of his people to RNCERTAIN's relatives to say that they were in the Mirdita zone. *Idem P*

Comment: The true names of the ORANGE and PLUM men who were dropped on 4 June 1953 ~~as~~ Hazhi Gjyla, Nuri Plaka, Zenon Gjollen and Pal Nikolla. It may not be certain, therefore, whether the Pal Lushi of APPLE/2's message referred to one of these men. Headquarters and the field

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apparently interpreted it as referring to Pal Nikolla, the PLUM leader. Assuming that it did refer to one of the men, ~~the message~~ the message could be either a legitimate accounting for them, or if APPLE/2 were controlled, an attempt by the opposition, alerted by the base's case officer control challenge of 19 June, to further resolve the base's doubts concerning APPLE/2 by presenting indirect evidence of the safety of ORANGE and PLUM.

- 2 July 1953 Headquarters, in turning down a field plan for independently determining the fate of ORANGE and PLUM, gave as one of its reasons the belief that it could get the information through APPLE/2 "which operative and apparently not controlled".
- 11 July 1953 APPLE/2 requested the speedy return of AIRTIGHT.
Comment: According to previous plans, AIRTIGHT, after exfiltrating with APPLE/3, would return. The request is thus either legitimate, or if APPLE/2 at this point was controlled, either realistic dissemblage, an attempt to entice somebody else, or evidence that APPLE/3 had been uncontrolled and this was an attempt either to entice his return or obtain information about him.
- 22-26 July 1953 APPLE/2 received a resupply drop on 22 July. An abortive attempt had previously been made on 3 July. On 26 July APPLE/2 reported it had received three of five parachuted containers.
Comment: Possible intoxication effort for another drop.
- 13-31 August 1953 APPLE/2 on 13, 19, and 31 August again asked for AIRTIGHT; it also expressed concern about the condition of its radio and the possibility of the loss of radio contact. Concern over the radio was repeated again on 31 August.
Comment: See comments above under dates of 11 July 1953 and 22-26 July 1953. In addition, if the team were controlled, a poor radio provides an excuse for cutting down traffic at a time when the operation is very sensitive and provides an explanation for the falling off in APPLE/2 performance commented upon by [] on 5 September.
- 1 September 1953 APPLE/2 stated it was awaiting the drop of a needed radio and batteries. The base alerted the team for a drop during the period from 19 to 22 September and asked if the team could exfiltrate to Greece. Headquarters on 6 July had first suggested requesting RNCERTAIN's exfiltration.
- 14 September 1953 APPLE/2 parried the base's 1 September request:

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"We are waiting for (AIRTIGHT) and you tell us to return to Greece. This, and no answer on the information promised about (AIRTIGHT) has us greatly worried. We await information tomorrow."

Comment: See comments above under date of 11 July 1953; also possible stalling tactic.

15-19 September 1953 The base informed APPLE/2 on 15 September that AIRTIGHT could not return and that the team must make plans to come out. APPLE/2 was instructed to notify the base before leaving as the base might be able to help it. APPLE/2 replied on 17 September that it could not stay without AIRTIGHT and would think of coming after its expected and needed drop. The team was successfully resupplied on 19 September during a flight which also resupplied another operation (Hil Shllaku). *John A*

Comment: If controlled, the team's traffic could be pressure to entice the 19 September drop. If the drop was made to an opposition reception group there is the possibility that the security of the other resupply drop was endangered. On the other hand, if the team were controlled why was the plane not fired upon at the D/Z? The instructions to exfiltrate would have warned the opposition that the playback could not long continue. The possibility of enticing another drop existed but would have had to be regarded as a gamble. The gamble might have been regarded as negligible since it might have been estimated that the APPLE/2 base would seek to maintain contact as long as there was any possibility of the team exfiltrating.

John
It is also possible that Sigurimi liaison arrangements with the Albanian Army to set up an A/A reception required more time. At any rate since APPLE/2 had not given a clear-cut answer to the base's request that it exfiltrate, the base might have raised the other case officer control challenge given THROWOFF/2. A possible disadvantage, however, would have been the fact that if the team were controlled and the opposition was actually planning to send back a turned agent, the control challenge might have dissuaded them.

26-29 September 1953 APPLE/2 advised on 26 September that it was contacting its principal friends before departing. On 29 September it informed the base that it would start exfiltrating about 15 October after contacting its friends.

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- 4-16 October 1953 On 4 October APPLE/2 requested permission to exfiltrate with some friends. The base approved on 14 October if APPLE/2 was sure of their bona fides. In response to a request for their names APPLE/2 on 16 October radioed the names of three friends known to AIRTIGHT. Headquarters has only recently received these names by pouch and traces have not yet been completed.
Comment: If the team were not yet controlled, one of the "friends" might have been a security hazard. If the team were controlled, the inclusion of friends in the exfiltration group might have been for build-up.
- 13-17 October 1953 APPLE/2 reported on 13 October that it intended to start exfiltrating on 22 October and requested a drop of food, and clothing for the friends going along with them. The drop was requested again on 16 and 17 October. (The base on 16 October warned the team of the security hazards involved in a drop.)
Comment: Possible intoxication attempt by the opposition.
- 19-23 October 1953 The base on 19 October asked for a D/Z and told APPLE/2 to await a drop during the period 21 to 25 October. On 22 October APPLE/2 reported that it had been awaiting a drop from 19 to 22 October at D/Z I-1531 and that it would await a drop from 23 to 25 October at D/Z I-1531. The base then asked the field to await a drop that night (22 October) but was told by APPLE/2 during an extra contact the same day that it could not receive a drop that night as it was not yet at the D/Z, but could await a drop on 23 October. On 23 October APPLE/2 reported the D/Z area as quiet and that it was awaiting a drop. Complete texts of these messages have not yet been received in Headquarters.
Comment: If the team was controlled, the opposition, by choosing the D/Z, would be able to select one more suited to their purposes. The fact that APPLE/2 on 22 October reported that it had been awaiting a drop since 19 October, and then later that day indicated that it was not yet at the same D/Z and so could not receive a drop that night, is suspicious. If the team were controlled, the delay could have been to make better preparations for an A/A attack on the plane.
- 23 October 1953 While making a resupply drop on the night of 23 October, the C-47 was hit by 20-MM A/A fire from first two and then five more batteries at the T-lighted APPLE/2 D/Z area. The plane was forced to make an emergency exit and to land at Brindisi, Italy. It is not known whether another resupply drop scheduled to be made during this flight ((for HII Shllaku) was made prior to the APPLE/2 drop.
- J. A. J. V.

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Comment: Although APPLE/2 probably was under control during the W/T traffic setting up the drop, it is also possible theoretically that the team was surprised enough ahead of time at or near the D/Z area to enable A/A batteries to be placed into position. Radio communication control signals continued negative to the end, including a negative response to radio communication control challenge on 22 October.

Note:

This review does not include a discussion of the CE implications of the handling and movement of the plane and its pilots from the time of the plane's arrival in Brindisi, since such events have no bearing on the question of control of the APPLE complex.

J. V

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CONVERSION OF ELEVATIONS

Feet	Meters
10,000	3,000
9,000	2,500
8,000	2,000
7,000	1,500
6,000	1,000
5,000	500
4,000	1,000
3,000	2,000
2,000	3,000
1,000	4,000
140	0

Feet	Meters
10,000	3,000
9,000	2,500
8,000	2,000
7,000	1,500
6,000	1,000
5,000	500
4,000	1,000
3,000	2,000
2,000	3,000
1,000	4,000
140	0

Feet	Meters
10,000	3,000
9,000	2,500
8,000	2,000
7,000	1,500
6,000	1,000
5,000	500
4,000	1,000
3,000	2,000
2,000	3,000
1,000	4,000
140	0

Feet	Meters
10,000	3,000
9,000	2,500
8,000	2,000
7,000	1,500
6,000	1,000
5,000	500
4,000	1,000
3,000	2,000
2,000	3,000
1,000	4,000
140	0

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A D R Security Inform

International Boundary Closed to Passage of Aircraft

SEA

EM

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IONIAN

TO REFERENCE BY THE GEOREF (SHOWN IN BLUE) TO MINUTES

Select Nearest Intersection South and West of Point

Sample Point: VALTOS

1. PJ identifies basic 15° quadrangle

2. MM identifies 1° quadrangle

3. 21 identifies Georef minute of longitude

4. 32 identifies Georef minute of latitude

5. Sample reference: PJMM2132

19°E

20°E

21°E

NAUTICAL MILES

10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

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



10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70




10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

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

CITIES and TOWNS

Metropolitan Areas.....NEW YORK 
 Large Cities.....RICHMOND 
 Cities.....ARLINGTON 
 Small Cities.....SANGATE 
 Large Towns.....Corville 
 Towns & Villages.....Arcola 

HIGHWAYS and ROADS

Dual Lane Highways.....
 Primary Roads.....
 Secondary Roads.....
 Trails.....
 U. S. Road Markers.....
 National, State or Provincial Road Markers.....
 Road Names.....ALASKA HIGHWAY 

RELIEF FEATURES

Contours { Reliable.....
 Depression.....
 Approximate.....
 Bluffs, Cliffs & Escarpments.....
 Sand { Dunes.....
 Areas.....
 Ridges.....

HYDROGRAPHIC FEATURES

Swamps & Marshes.....
 Mud & Tidal Flats (Exposed at low tide).....
 Fathom Line (Dots uniformly spaced) (1 fathom, 6 ft. below mean low water level).....
 Danger Line (Dots grouped in pairs) (2 fathoms, 12 ft. below mean low water level).....
 Charted Rocks.....
 Sand Bars (Exposed at low tide).....
 Springs.....
 Wells & Water Holes.....
 Reefs, Coral & Rocky Ledges (Awash at low tide).....
 Streams & Rivers { Perennial.....
 Intermittent.....
 Probable or Unsurveyed.....
 Unclassified.....
 Braided.....
 Intermittent Lakes.....
 Drainage Ditches.....
 Canals { In use.....
 Abandoned.....
 Flood Marked Areas.....
 Sand Deposits.....
 Dry Washes.....
 Glaciers.....

CULTURAL and MISCELLANEOUS

Power Transmission Lines.....
 Telephone & Telegraph Lines.....
 Dams.....
 Elevations { Highest in a General Area (Highest on chart is devoid of tint).....
 (In feet) Spot.....
 Mines and Quarries.....
 Mountain Passes.....
 Lookout Towers (Elevation is base of tower) (Height above ground).....
 Forts.....
 Pipelines.....
 Race Tracks.....
 Stranded Wrecks.....
 Boundaries { International.....
 State & Provincial.....
 Intercolonial & Interterritorial.....
 Defacto.....
 * The same as Intercolonial symbol on some charts
 Abandoned or Under Construction.....
 Single Track.....
 Railroads { Double Track.....
 Sidings & Spurs.....
 Overpass.....
 Underpass.....
 Bridges { Railroad.....
 Highway.....
 Tunnels { Railroad.....
 Highway.....

CS
OWEN AIRWAYS
4785

CS
KAZAN
5200 WYZW

BS
WOL
1280

RACON
9310
1-2-2

CONSOL
SEVILLA
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